must always be called on by a judge when the judge goes about adjudicating. For instance, legislation and case law which must be identified in a “pre-interpretative stage” Then in the following stages, the judge must always question himself whether his interpretation of this network “could form part of a coherent theory justifying the network as a whole. No actual judge could compose of anything approaching a full interpretation of all of his community’s law at once. But an actual judge can (…) allow the scope of his interpretation to fan out from the cases immediately in point to cases in the same general area or department of law, and then still farther, so far as this seems promising.”  In accordance with Dworkin’s arguments, the interpretation of law should not only fit into the legal system but also be the best normative justification of law as such, this means that not only must the interpretation of the judge’s be consistent with the law identified at the “pre-interpretative stage”, but also the law must be interpreted in a way which is the best in the participants’ mind. Moreover, according to Dworkin’s theory, both the judge and any other participant should adjust his own sense of “of what the practice really requires so as better to serve the justification he accepts at the interpretative stage.We notice that, in accordance with Dworkin, morality affects the whole process of adjudication of cases. By contrast, he dose not express the view that a certain case should be adjudicated and resolved on the basis of sole considerations of justice. Dworkin claims that the moral standards should be derived form the explicit and existing legal practice and contrary to positivists, Dworkin believes that “moral principles that cohere with past legal practice are valid propositions of law as well-so much so that these principles can and should go beyond what legal conventions teach us the law is.