Whilst positivism set the groundwork for the debates that are to follow, the ‘quantitative revolution’ acted as the trigger. In the 1950s Geography’s “low reputation as a science” led to an increase in positivist and quantitative approaches to human geography as the discipline attempted to legitimise itself by producing laws based on observational evidence (Unwin, 1992 p.106). Indeed geography had shifted dramatically from a traditional idiographic descriptive approach to that of a nomothetic, thriving on evidence and statistics. Of course both approaches are still present in contemporary geography, yet the rise in positivist research is undeniable. This of course leads us to the criticisms that one half of the geographical divide have levelled at their positivistic adversaries.As outlined in the introduction, most of the criticisms aimed at positivism in human geography are loosely based around its shallow nature, sweeping statements and lack of normative questions. The first major critique of the positivist approach is its over tendency to focus on space, this has been termed ‘spatial fetishism’. Livingstone (1992, p.328) goes as far as to suggest that “Geography’s confrontation with the vocabulary of logical positivism… was a post hoc means of rationalizing its attempt to reconstitute itself as a spatial science”. Geography should be covering more than just space and scales, indeed it is called human geography as its intent should be to uncover peoples experiences and interactions with the world and each other. It is certainly easy to criticise positivism if its purpose was to prioritise ‘spatial science’ over other geographies. The progress of the discipline would certainly be limited if the majority of research was based only on quantitative spatial analysis and modelling. Sack (1980) agrees that positivistic geography’s spatial feitsh has been at the expense of all other aspects of geography.