美国特拉华论文代写:超越法律约定

Keywords:美国特拉华论文代写:超越法律约定

必须始终由法官召集。例如，立法和判例法必须在“前解释阶段”中确定，然后在接下来的阶段中，法官必须始终自问，他对这个网络的解释“是否能够构成一个连贯的理论的一部分，证明这个网络是一个整体”。任何一个真正的法官都不可能同时对他所在社区的法律作出全面的解释。但一个真正的法官可以(…)允许他的解释范围从案件中迅速扩大到同一一般领域或法律部门的案件，然后再进一步，就目前看来是有希望的。”[9]依照德沃金的论点,解释法律不仅要符合法律体系也成为最好的规范性的法律理由,这不仅意味着法官的解释必须符合法律确定的“法律pre-interpretative阶段”,但也必须理解,这是最好的参与者的思想。此外，根据德沃金的理论，法官和任何其他参与者都应该调整自己对“实践真正需要什么”的感觉，以便更好地为他在解释阶段接受的辩护服务。我们注意到，按照德沃金的说法，道德影响案件审理的整个过程。相比之下，他没有表达这样一种观点，即某一案件应该在公正的基础上进行判决和解决。德沃金声称应该派生形式明确的道德标准和现有的法律实践和实在法学派相反,德沃金认为“道德原则符合过去的法律实践是有效的法律主张,所以,这些原则可以而且应该超越法律约定教我们法律是什么。
美国特拉华论文代写:超越法律约定
must always be called on by a judge when the judge goes about adjudicating. For instance, legislation and case law which must be identified in a “pre-interpretative stage” Then in the following stages, the judge must always question himself whether his interpretation of this network “could form part of a coherent theory justifying the network as a whole. No actual judge could compose of anything approaching a full interpretation of all of his community’s law at once. But an actual judge can (…) allow the scope of his interpretation to fan out from the cases immediately in point to cases in the same general area or department of law, and then still farther, so far as this seems promising.” [9] In accordance with Dworkin’s arguments, the interpretation of law should not only fit into the legal system but also be the best normative justification of law as such, this means that not only must the interpretation of the judge’s be consistent with the law identified at the “pre-interpretative stage”, but also the law must be interpreted in a way which is the best in the participants’ mind. Moreover, according to Dworkin’s theory, both the judge and any other participant should adjust his own sense of “of what the practice really requires so as better to serve the justification he accepts at the interpretative stage.We notice that, in accordance with Dworkin, morality affects the whole process of adjudication of cases. By contrast, he dose not express the view that a certain case should be adjudicated and resolved on the basis of sole considerations of justice. Dworkin claims that the moral standards should be derived form the explicit and existing legal practice and contrary to positivists, Dworkin believes that “moral principles that cohere with past legal practice are valid propositions of law as well-so much so that these principles can and should go beyond what legal conventions teach us the law is.