因此，马尔萨斯的结论必须在上下文中观察。中国政府在1980或目前印度政府将某些地区的土著出生率限制为每对夫妇一个孩子，以此作为减少贫困人口和贫困人口救济支出的一种手段，这与中国政府的推论是不一样的。然而，显而易见的是，马尔萨斯很快就发现了问题的影响，而没有准确地找到问题的根源。在指责贫困救济支出的增加对穷人的增加增加他完全错过了点。回想起来，这是历史学家指出英国早期的工业人口爆炸背后的真正原因更容易，杰克逊和Timmins通过了一项任务（1989:134）。 “值得一提的是生育率明显好转的1750年代和1820年代之间，这才是真正的动力都来自于人口的增长导致平均结婚年龄的下降，也对人们在每一代中结婚人数的比例增加。”[ 2 ] 因此，对人口从农村到城市的必然转变不可避免的社会变化，随着工资的增加，预期寿命和家庭所在地的目的（在工业时期的一个大家庭，构成了一个机会来增加家中的工资数）确定了对穷人的支出增加结果的因素远远超出了控制繁殖、性观念和更广泛的工人阶级的社会行为。
Malthus’ conclusion must therefore be viewed in context. It is not dissimilar to the deduction made by Chinese authorities during the 1980’s or the current Indian Government to limit indigenous births in certain regions to one child per couple as a means of reducing the state’s spending on relief for the poor and the needy. What becomes apparent, however, is that Malthus was quick to identify the effects of the malaise without accurately locating the root of the problem. In blaming the increase in poor relief expenditure on the increase in breeding of the poor he missed the point entirely. In retrospect, it is easier for historians to pinpoint the true reasons behind the early industrial population explosion of Britain, a task adopted by Jackson and Timmins (1989:134).
“What was remarkable was the apparent upturn in fertility between the 1750’s and the 1820’s. This was the real driving force behind population growth resulting both from a decline in the average age at marriage and also from an increase of the proportion of the number of people marrying in each generation
Thus, the inevitable sociological changes of the inexorable shift of the population from the countryside to the town, with an increase in wages, life expectancy and purpose of the locus of family (a larger family in the industrial period constituted an opportunity to increase the number of wages in the household) made sure that the increase in expenditure on the poor was the result of factors far beyond the control of breeding, sexual mores and broader working class social behaviour.