美国佛蒙特essay代写:拉丁美洲执行

Keywords:美国佛蒙特essay代写

华盛顿共识在20世纪90年代在拉丁美洲的许多国家得到了强有力的执行，以美国为首的努力推动美国经济走向南部。特别是在墨西哥，它被视为拯救经济的道路，墨西哥–逸出“糟糕的经济政策很容易克服的更好地坚持新古典经济学说”（Cypher，1998：48）。因为智利有就业政策共识的人主张，这被视为一个迹象，任何国家实现它们当然会看到伟大的事情发生在他们身上–认为智利是例外，或已经成功了，尽管不是因为那些政策出现不出现他们。墨西哥也许很不幸试图执行政策时的亚洲经济危机减少将投资于拉丁美洲的美国一样，但事实上是无法避免的，所有的解除管制和市场自由化的发生，小的外国资本进入经济通常不是由于他们的新的市场地位，与共，这几乎把巨大的贸易赤字不可能持续很久；典型的华盛顿共识发展中的经济体，尽管在5%经济温和增长，工资下降了一三年期三分之一（Cypher，1998：48）。不管是经济作为一个整体，它是不会赢得共识，和一揽子政策，它需要实现为了好玩，没有朋友的墨西哥人发现他们的贫穷是由于实施中，没有明显的增益以外的人丰富的外国投资者。虽然在墨西哥的外国投资也达到1997亿美元，这是一个高峰，而不是一个平台，而不是从其中一些墨西哥人，墨西哥经济，还是墨西哥，都会从中受益的长期。
美国佛蒙特essay代写:拉丁美洲执行
The Washington Consensus was enforced heavily in many countries in Latin America in the 1990s, in an American led effort to boost the economies to their south. In Mexico in particular, it was seen as the road to Mexican economic salvation – the way to escape “bad economic policy easily overcome by better adherence to neoclassical economic doctrines” (Cypher, 1998: 48). Because Chile had employed the policies advocated by the holders of the Consensus, it had been seen as a sign that any country which implemented them properly would of course see great things happen to them – the idea that Chile had been the exception, or had succeeded in spite rather than because of those policies appeared never to occur to them. Mexico perhaps had the misfortune to attempt to implement the policies at the same time as the Asian economic crisis was reducing the will to invest in Latin America, but the fact cannot be avoided that for all the de-regulation and market liberalisation that occurred, the little foreign capital that came into the economy was typically not due to their new market position, and altogether, this barely hid a yawning trade deficit which could not possibly be sustained for long; typical of Washington Consensus developing economies, despite moderate economic growth of around 5%, wages fell by a third in a three year period (Cypher, 1998: 48). Whatever this did for the economy as a whole, it was never going to win the Consensus, and the package of policies that it required to be implemented in order to be fun, any friends among the Mexican people who were finding that they were poorer as a result of implementing it, with no obvious gain to anyone except the rich foreign investors. Although foreign investment in Mexico did reach $50bn in 1997, this was a peak rather than a plateau, and not something from which the Mexican people, the Mexican economy, nor Mexico would benefit from in the long run.